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Side 1, Recorded December 17, 1984, page 1--Edward G. Lansdal e 
, - ., ~ ~ 
i nventor, 
L: ... -fl'-'00 _. We worked together in OPC. 
C: What does OPC stand for? 
L: It was· .. uh ... it was uh the name purposely made very obscure. I think, if 
I remember Office of Policy Coordination, or something like that. It was made 
vague on purpose and it was formed by the State Department and Defense 
originally, in the early Truman days. Is this on? 
C: Yes·. I 'll turn it off i f you want me to . 
L: No , t hat' s a ll right. 
L: I ' m trying to remember the year. I think it was 1949 and I 'm not 
entirely sure of this . 
,. /'1 De.../\ V ,., 
But I was at Lowry Air Force Base a · ~ em :fJ~ 
S c.J,..,"f + k e ..- e- ,I w~ s; ~ 
tnat i's- Lowry, ~ the strategic intelligencej\w-lw=wE! ~ e, teacher, 
+he r 
l ectured \ and they sent some of us from the training schools there down to 
learn modern educational methods of teaching down in Alabama; tt must have 
been the summer of '49, and I forget the Air Force Base, it ts a little 
rural one in Selma, Alabama, but there was faculty from Columhia University 
up in New York down there teaching us and some of the Air Force was as well 
to upgrade the training of " the Air Force training program ? and they wer e 
runnfog everything on a percentage basis, all the grades· and everything, 
and I' was conceY'ned that they had picked me out to go there, b.ecause that 
meant that they were going to stick me in to teach for the rest of my care.er 
in the Air Force, which wasn't the thing that I had gotten in the Air Force 
for at all, and so I was trying to figure out how to, how to be in the top 
ten, but at the bottom of the top ten someplace so that I would get good grades 
I 
and be well thought of and leave a good record but not be where I was going 
to be stuck for the rest of my life in it . So I very carefully in all the exams 
and everything would mis·s questions and riot . . . and so on so that I was tryi'ng 
to figure out what the class percentages were and so on. And on graduation 
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L: day that summer they ca 11 ed me up and congratulated me on being number one 
tn tne class, whtch was the last damn thi'ng I wanted, so I went from that ins-tead 
of returning immediately out to Lowry Air Force Bas:e in Colorado, l headed for 
Was-hi'ngton and -made a fast vi'si t to Washington and among others, I saw- tni s-
Co l onel that I riad served with in the Phillipines, Ches ter, Colonel George 
J:_ h i m 
Ches:ter. He was on the Joint Staff and"was telling,1that I was desperate for 
sometb_tng to get off of teaching in the Air Force and that it was comi'ng to 
i,.,,J. ~ ..... !,.+ 
a desperate thing that the~ \sent me to a school for teachers and I apparently 
made good and which. I hadn I t wanted to do, and could he fi:gure out some way that 
I could get out of it? And he satd, yes, something was coming on, he would 
sttck my name in the hopper and see if there would be some way of getti:ng out 
of it, so when I got back to Denver, it was a couple of weeks la te.r, the guy, 
Atr Force Colonel came through and ... whom I hadn't known and started talking 
to me about a group forming in Washington for Cold ~Jar duty and my ears prtcked 
up and tt sounded good and r said that I'm for it, I volunteer right off. So 
he satd, well I want you to know you are being favored very., . considered very 
favorably- and you will probably heal" about it right away-. I had jus-t gotten 
my pl"omotion to Lt. Colonel, and among other things for the grades I had 
gotten down at Selma, Alabama, for being a good teacher, and so the next 
thi'ng these fol ks: came thrnugh and ordered me to Washi:ngton fol" new duti'es-. 
And I went in and they were just forming this organization and they dtdn 1 t 
meet tn any regular government building; we were meeting i:n a, part of an 
in l-owf\ 
old Naval installationAnear the Lincoln Memorial, and then in some tempo 
butldi'ngs near the Lincoln Memori'al; tempos from World Nar II. And I ~at 
in and di:d that and i:t was fascinating work , Tti.ey- swore me to secrecy of 
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L: wnatever r was: doing and not even to tell my own family, and so I didn't. 
And r forever kept that to myself except right now when I am talki'ng about it. 
!ntti'al ly I was working on Soviet Union problems because in my teaching out at 
Lowry r had taken the Economy of the Soviet Union as one of my subjects for 
lecture and bad gone. down to the public libraries in Denver and done all my 
research tn open sources at the public 1 ibrary system of Denver, and tlie Ai:r 
Force was screami'ng at me to classify these things where r had gotten them 
fr-om open sources and anybody else could have done the same tb.tng, and probably 
did, some other people, but ... l put together lectures that l. .. and surprisingly 
enough the Royal Canadian Air Force asked me to go up to give the lectures· up 
to them in Canada but r never did that. I was more interested in getting out 
of 1 ecturtng at the ttme. But when we were in Washington, my fami'ly was tn 
Californta at the ti'me,- my wtfe :-and ·sons were out there., I had never moved them 
+-o rv1e. 
to Lowry Atr Force Base. It was an unknown assignment t\ and teaching was not 
. )'? e ,,. ..... a.. .. e.~+ 
my forte really I didn't feel and I never felt i.t was: • and I was· very 
s·ki:ttts:h about getttng them a 11 tangled up in moves and so forth · and maybe 
not staytng there. and havi'ng a very temporary , , , so they were still tn Ca, l i.fornta, 
and when I moved to Was·htngton I stayed tn the BOQ at Ft ~ Meyer which wc1s 
close enough. I could wa 1 k. I used to wa 1 k acros~s the oddge into Wa.s:fn' ngton 
to work every morning. But the more r got into Cold War prohl ems tne -more 
I got to worrytng c1bout the Phi 11 i pines that l had jus·t left hecc1us:e a,s th:e 
G .... 2 and Army G-2 there I' hc1d gone way into the .-.Huk problems and had Eleen a 11 
over the battle grounds where the Hol(~fighting was going on, had analyzed a 
great deal of it and reported on it, and at the same time a similar thing was 
w' +-'1 
happening in Greece WRef"e" the Communist partisans in Greece fighting the Greek 
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+-h~y 
L: Army andtl finally- got defeated in Greece, but i'n the Phi'lliptnes they, 
weren't and r knew a great deal of ... a great many of the problems· there. So 
C 
r s:et ... tf.te ftght against the Communists in the Phi'lltpines .18'. the number one 
task for myself. t s:tarted worktng on some of the things that I s:a\>t at the 
Hme that needed doing that weren't being done, and about then a Pbillipines:" 
Congressman, Ramon Magsaysay, who was the Chairman of the Phillipine House 
Defense Committee, came to Washington on some Veterans' benefits programs, to 
get some help from the U. S. Congress, and he had Whal en, a Phi 11 tpine Army 
Colonel who was an old friend of mine, this Montemayor is his name. 
C: How is it s·pelled? /I 
L: MONTE MAYO R .. I can 1 t tell you his first name right off hand. 
t have a card in there on it. But Montemayor started telling me about this 
Congressman that he was with and said he had a lot of ideas about fighting 
the Huks· and s·o forth and that he was an all right person and he said he 
thought I vwul d like hi'm very much so we had dinner together and I got to 
talktng and I tmmediately liked him. We liked each other when we met and 
we started discussing some of the things that were wrong, including thtngs 
. w ,.fl,. +t..e.iK. o-.. .... d. 
wrong wt th the Phil l ipines· Armed Forces J;r;i~ thei'r dealings some of the things 
wrong wi'th some of the generals out there and so on and we very much agreed 
on that and then I started testing out some of my ideas with him and he liked 
tt. Well, I had put together a program whkh I had typewritten a,nd whtch I 
was try·tng to get U, S. policy makers to agree to support in the way of helping 
the gove·rnment of the Phil l ipines against the Communist guerri'l las· there and 
they· had a,pprove.d it, the ideas that I had, and they were di:s:cuss t ng whether 
ou.+-
I: s·hould go • or not . So Magsaysay was ... said he wanted to go back and talk 
to the Presi:dent of the Phillipines on a program, so we sat in my room up in 
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L: the BOQ at Ft. Meyer and I had a portable typewriter and he was sitti ng 
next to me, and I asked him a question of what he wanted and he would reply 
to me and I would put it i:n my words on the paper and it went down i:n sequence 
the same as the. program that I had just sold the U. S. policy makers and in tne 
same language. r showed it to Magsaysay and gave him a copy and fte agreed to 
it. And I' said that I wanted him to meet some people around Washington and 
II ss .-s f-tfl.,"+ 
t arranged a lunch for two days later and I got people like tb.e ASecretary of 
State, so r h.qd about stx or seven policy i_ns:ide people in, .. it was Truman \s; 
admtntstrati'on ... to have lunch with us. They had a 11 been familiar witf1 what 
I' was· pushing and by· and large were in agreement with it, and so her-e I got 
tnts- fi'l i'pi'no and this Congressman and said that he had some ideas about how 
to go about th.e Huks and he said roughly the same that I had been saytng. And 
all the America,ns were surprised at that, so it wound up they , ,. s·ome .. . two of 
them went out later and talked to President Quirtno and got Magsaysay appoi:nted 
as Se.cretary of Defense for having these ideas. 
C: Who were they? 
L: Well, one of them was this Colonel Chester I was talking about. Another 
one was- a guy from State, whose name I can't think of right now·. But some 
were from the Jotnt Chiefs and some were from State. But anyhow, I have never 
told this and this i's no deregation of Magsaysay who was very much a right 
person in his own rights and had his own ideas and deserves every b,tt of 
credit that he ever got for what he did as Secretary of Defense; and i's one 
of the few very great people I: have known, is solid all the way through , But 
anyhow, after he had gone back to the Phil l i pi:nes the.y- fi:na lly agreed tha,t r 
could go out and try- out 'ITJY tdeqs in the Phi:11 ipi'nes and ther-e ts a que.stton 
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L: allout -money and about the commi'tments of the U .s., and about then, 
Prestdent Quirino was looki:ng for help with his intelligence 
A"' J.e...-~o •"'\ c~) 
fl'\A-A G-
and the ,~ 
Chi'ef at that ttme was General Henderson who had been my Commander out in 
,411 Je-r.!><• •I (?. ) 
the Phtl l tpines' at one time, and Henderson came back and said you'd be a 
perfect man to go tnto that job. there. I s·aid why don't you go back and 
tell Quiri'no that, so he did and after Quirino invtted me out to work. 
as· an intelli'gence advisor for him and for JUSMAAG. These people se.ndtng 
me out ... I had to have a cover and they said that's th.e loustest cover 
we have ever heard of, you know, to go out as an intelligence chief. r 
satd, why not, Pm not goi:ng to be doing intelligence work . l can do th.at 
on the side and it wtll all be germane and at the same time: I wi'l l b.e anead 
of the game, you know, and they were all shaking their heads; they· dtdn't 
want me to go at all because my cover was weak and so on. And, .. 
C: So as a member of the OPC, you go to the Phtl l ipines with a cover 
as an intelligence person? 
L: As an tntelli'genceperson, but a military intelli_gence person to advis:e. 
mtltta.ry· ... PhilHptne mtlita.ry intelligence, who were all old friends· and 4-1,.e. wei 
o--+- .\--k-t- e.." l w t- ,, t 
whom l had already helped establish themselves after World War H A .reforming 
the Pf:ti'll tpine Army. So this was sort of taking up old duti'es b.ut among 
,very close friends: of mine who were doing an excellent job and di'dn 1 t need 
any advke. The . President, Quirino, had to listen to them better tha,n he 
did was hts -main problem, but one other thing happened tn there , l was con-
cerned, r.,, tlie enemy was far more ski'lled at psychological operations and 
polttical operattons than we were because they ... they had sold themselves· to 
the people where they were tn central Luzon and had a lot of support and tt 
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L: was· from the heart wtth these people and not to thinking in a logi'cal 
type of support, and l wanted to learn something about psychological 
operattons. I knew· nothing about it. There was no military school on 
psychologtcal operations, nothing going. There were a couple of old books 
on it from World War II, but nothing substantial and pertinent to the 
campaign out tn Ute Phtlli'pines. So I talked to friends of mine in the 
Pentagon and got the names of people who, and also people who had been in 
Psy war, and got the names: of people who had been practicing it in World 
Warn and had some practical experience and were doing other things at 
the time. Many of them were journalists and so forth and had gone back to 
their own fleld of journalism and so forth. But I talked to the Pbillipines· 
Mil ttary Attache and asked him how many Phil li'pine students, military students-, 
were in the U.S and he told me. It was something, 20 or 25 of th.em, going 
to different milttary schools in the U.S. I said at the end of their term 
can you route. them through Washington and I will set up th.is school in the 
Pentagon and we will all go to it, you and me include.ct. So he did, and he 
got all of the Phillipine students that were in the U. S. at the. ttme, go i ng 
to school, to come through and we sat down at a school .. • I bad just borrowed 
a room over in the Pentagon and got people coming on their own, they patd 
their own way for it, and reminisce about what. .. told war stori_es about 
-1-here-wer~ -1-h.A--f 
World War U, hut Britishl) decetved us at Sai_nt Saens, telling me what 
h d ' d A . wlJ,,'1.,,._Jd . f k b. . f h l . l t .ey 1 , _ meri-cans~use a1rcra t, tan . com 1nat10ns or psyc o oglca 
operati"ons against the enemy and they taught me one thing vr:ry clear, you 
can us:e it tactically to get something done, all you have to fi:gure out ts:· 
what do you want the enemy to do and then use psychologi'Cal m~ans to get 
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L: them to do it, And there is either . .• he is in a hole, you want hi'In out 
of the hole s0 you can shoot him, what do you tell him to get him out of the 
hole, see? Yem are right within our sight, we are going to blow you out of 
there, we will give you two seconds to get out, when he jumps up, shoot him , 
see? That type of thing . But I used to remember that, so ..• there were a 
number of things like that which are univers ally appl i cable . I had never 
thought of it before, but it taught me that. . . like a machine gun or a small 
weapon like a 37 Howitzer or something was a support type of weapon which we 
used right in combat along with . •. much the same way .t:.t': ,:t change the enemy over 
to your advantage somehow or other , and also I learned disinformation types· 
of things and .•. it was all to make the enemy do something. That ' s what the 
01'\ 
enemy was using4us, and all of a sudden it is . . • suddenly a mystery starte.d. 
clearing away of the simplest sort for me and I suddenly start understanding 
what had been happening that seemed so mysterious to us out there . And so the 
·Filipinos were on there, and so when I got out there eventually I started 
of 
psychological operations with somefJ these guys who had been in our school 
together back there. And we eventually changed it around and got some more 
a nd I borrowed some other ideas from the Communists in stacking up the 
on + 1-,Q. -+ '1.'nj f-o 
polit\:tcal chain of comma rrl much along their line5 ~~ go back 
doubling along the military chain of command and getting up to the top and 
getting the attention of the top at the same time and getting some backing, 
but getting them to work together out in the field very closely. But with 
W<t-~ 
that I. . . w e~e set to go out, and I was going out all alone at first, but 
"' ~ I was· worried and r t orked with one intelligence officer in the Army a long 
time who loved the Phillipines and he loved it intensely, and I took him along 
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L: with me, Bohannan was- his name, and a very independent sort of ' per son, · 
S€lf- thinker , and he US€d to reassure my wife he was going to make s-ur e that 
it was all right when I' got out ther.e , and the Huks·, he knew· them and would 
take care of me and so on . And he hadn't known what I was- doing when I' was 
s~!f'J±':t . G-2 out there. I would send ·my men in to view oper,-at.i:ons- w:i_th. the 
Phil l ipine forces and then go out and figure out what the Huks would do and 
go up and meet them when they would get out of the traps that the Army would 
set for them, the Phillipine military. I would figure out where they· were 
heading for high. ground up in the mountains and jus t camp out on their trail 
and talk to them. 
C: Why didn ' t they kill you? 
L: Huh.? 
C: Why· didn't they kill you? 
.::tL-l't 
L: Uh, I was sitting there one person and they· were a group_; d armed sr-0 «-p 
a...nJ. -1-t-. y wcv..Jd f,-t,.(/<.. ,. , 
~ Well , you would smile and so forth~ you don t t ki.11 a guy· la,ugh±ng 
at you, being nice to you . 
c: rt ' s· happened. 
. . . 5=;,.. $ +-. 
L: Not real ly, not really . There is fear, you have ~ to show- fear ~ 
i::,u;r 
.G-@ci;a;:;ss:: A.nd you g_j_ye them something else to think of ti, and · I: would ask them · .i:f 
o r- ~ci d ~0•1t.e. ~D d 
they needed cigarettes:J\or did anybody want a drink, · yeu ·know~ They would 
come up a,nd say, yeah, I ' d like a drink, you know, ins-tei:\d of; shooti,ng me- and · 
getting the drink they say, let the guy pour it for -me first , you ·kn6w~ Now· 
one of the unknown things that I have never told anybody! Pi:it snowed -me a 
b~K. 
lot of the ~ country that the Huks went through. and sne does:n '-'t know: tha,t , 
I' know that she was·, that she was trying, was· helping them out from ti'Ine to ' 
i-oi..:,.i5; /V\A-+es. 
time , just being fellow ~~, you know·, sympathetic towards tfiem as· 
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L: individuals and carrying messages. She was a journalist to them, in 
their eyes ... in Manila. And yet as a towngirl up in the provinces, she knew 
trails up in the mountains back ... and trails ... So r would go and explore them 
tJ..~.., .J..-<.,<.; "' with her, she knew where Americans had hidden out after ~ and been 
captured by· the Japanese. She showed ·me all these things up in the ·m0untains-
that I would have never known otherwise, and very few people have ever known. 
fl,nd at one place there a Japanese column after the Lingayen,- 1a:nding wherCN.c.Ai!thur 
was coming back, the U.S. artillery caught a Japanese armored column back 
in the hills there, and they had been clobbered and killed i:l,nd their s·keletons-
were s·itting back in there and I used to go there, there was a bobcat one time 
that came up from these tqnks: and I, .. my jeep was there and he came up in the 
-F!E>onlit night and sat on the hood of my jeep looking down at where I was sleeping 
next to the jeep, you know, and it was the first time I've ever seen a bobcat 
;t.n the Phillipines, a great big cat, well, big, you know, bigger than normal; 
t0 me he looked like a giant in the moonlight. It was spooky enough with these 
Japanese dead around. But that was their high ground when they would come off 
o;E operations and the Army and the Americans, and everybody thought that they 
were on another,mountain, see, it was down from the plain, up Mt. Arayat, and j,is:+. ..._J. oC: +k ..... + 
® they would head for the "San Bolis" range at that time where they had their 
headquarters and other things. I did know where their headquarters was (illegible 
phrase) according to Pat, as a matter of fact, I don't think, I never asked him. 
Though I found out from others where it was, but it was on this route very close 
to where I taught. It's right next to the Air Force Base, Clark Air Force Base, 
and jet fighters would come up and their first bank would be right over where 
the Huk headquarters were. It took me a long time to find out exactly where 
they were and then we went and we chased them out of those mountai.ns· and they· 
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L: went over to another range of mountains. I' had been ... close to the 
problem is the reason I' was talking about it originally-, but I have alway-i,t 
felt like that, if you are going to report on something, dontt take the word 
of other people, go out and eyeball it and see and then talk to people. You 
get a •fa,r different feeling for the problem and the s-ituation, and so fortli, · 
So I got to know some of the Phillipine intelligence people in the -military· 
who were from that part of the country·, who were operating up tfi:ere . and 
,Ya,lerian0 was, one of them. And Valeriano was in the Phillipine Constabulary·, 
the National Police Force , and they originally were given the task of fightin9 
the Huks- and he was running an order battle section for them, and I' used to 
come over and help them from G-2 at AF where I' was• at thetime, · help ----
him make good in his work. But he told me he was· bored to tears, he wanted · 
to get out and get up close to them, and fight them up close, and he had -his 
men in close to them. So ... and he was very close to his co:mmanding general , 
whom J' also knew quite well, Castaneda. So we went in and talked Castaneda, 
into letting Valeriano take his unit, his men qut and fo:l'.'lll a unit up very 
clos€ to the Huks and fight them, instead of just gathering intelligence, 
do both, gather intelligence ... so Valeriano ;formed a unit that they· called 
the Menita unit, MENITA, it is just a Phillipine name, and it wasn 1' t any, •. 
it wasn I t a battalion, it wasn't a company, it was· about a cqmpa,ny· in s·ize, 
b.ut they were all volunteers and highly dedicated people and very, skillful · 
people. He picked the place that was supposed to be where their headquarters· 
were, 'Mt. Arayat, out from Pompanga, the Province of Pompanga apd p.ut up a 
camp up there and lived there with his· -men and fought theHuks very close a,nd 
he would take prisoners and keep them for a time up in his camp and try to 
change their ways, and so on, And also to leacr;n ,mqre a,hout what - the enerciy· 
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L: was· doing. And I was trying to find out as an intelligence officer what 
t)I(.+ 
was, going on in this country where we still had di visions,1 in the Phillipines· 
at the time--this was late '46. Well, they· became independent in ~46 , but 
just :Oefore that and we had, the Black Hawk Division was one I remember, out 
we had the Phillipine s-cout division up the other side of them. But I used 
to <JO up and visit Val's camp and he would beg me to stay· there, and I didn't 
know it at the time but he put up my name on one of the little shacks, tha,t • 
he put up in his camp and ... hillside camp .•. and he said when you ·are up he!l'e 
use this cabin I've built for you. And here were enemy prisoners being brought 
in to be reeducated and everything and they saw my name and they figured that 
I' ·mus·t have been a member of that group. And I remember, I went in and I was· 
trying to talk with Luis Taruc, their military· commander o;f the Huks·, And his· 
s--ister lived in a little town very near this place, just a few miles· down the 
road from it, was pregnant and she was losing her teeth, so I went to the Army 
hospital and got some calcium tablets for her to take, and I drove out there to 
g;i:ve. he:t:' the calcium tablets and let her know I would sure love to talk to her 
brother if he ever sneaked into town or not. And there, when I got into the 
town there was a lot of activity with the Constabulary troops· around searchi.ng 
and there seemed to be a very nervous tension in fue air. And I, the house was, 
sort of da,rk, and the housewives are like Japanese women, they •.• take off; your 
sh0es· so you won't get the floors muddy. So I stood at the do0r and I took 
off my shoes and it was dark and the door was partially open, so I' stuck ·my 
hea,d in and said, ''Anybody home'?", you know, anybody here and everything and 
some guns· jabbed into me and they were, it was Taruc's· bodyguard, I didn't 
Li f-i"j 
know it, they werel\ there. And they said that they knew who I was·, that I was 
a.. spy and all I could think of, I said don\ t shoot, look at the ;floor ; A,nd I~ 
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L: didn't do it, you know, to be smart alee or anything. I didn't even 
think cither than I was well brought up , too, you know, I said if youtre going 
to shoot me, do it outside ... what I would have said otherwise, but I said 
deem it get the floor ... and they were brought up by their mothers, oh, you never 
, .. shoot somebody in the house, you get the floor bloody and the women have 
to scrub up after you, so they didn't and so I was stuck on things-. They· 
said ... they had seen my name up at this camp on •.. they knew· I' was with. C<.., 
;1.,\e. f'\ : + .a._, 
C±H.--eg-i'ba-:e-phrase} unit they said. No, I'm not, I said, but they are friends 
0f mine, and they hated them. Oh, they are terrible people, and so on, they 
s-a,:i:d. Well, now let me explain something to you, what :t am , r· ~m with. G-2 
of the u.s . Army. And let me tell you what that is, and I said do you know, 
you get news· releases at your headquarters and you get couriers to take them 
-t-"o 
into the Manila papers,A print in the Manila press, and they risk their lives 
going in along on the bus rides and so forth into Manila to get them in there 
and going through the military lines and checkpoints to get tnem sa,fely· into 
Manila. c;:·;;~ And that's, to get your version of things· in the Manila pres·s, 
and if, your very good stories will get picked up by the Associated Press or 
United Press· and translated and sent on to the United States. And if they are 
very good the President of the United States reads them. So you get your s·tory 
before the President of the United States that way. I said, what I do, I write 
reports· on what people here tell me and send it in to the Pentagon and if they 
are go0d storie s· and unusual one they get right before the President of the 
United States· much faster than some of these news stories do. And I took out 
a pad 0f paper, and these guys were listening to me, the e xplanation. I 
said what do you want to tell the President of the United State~? And they· 
told me these things·, and they were telling me their policies· and why· they were 
doing things and s.o on, and I wrote it all down. Then I told them I had c0me 
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L: in to s-ee Turuc's sister and so on, and she was in the bedroom in the 
back of the house. I went in and introduced mys-elf and gave her the · pills·. 
Turuc had gone out the back window when I came in the front door. He ha,d ju$.t 
lSeen there. And the PC, the Cons·tabulary troops·, had g-otten repeir-ts• tfiat he · 
was in town and were looking for him. Why they didn't go to his· si-s,ter' s· 
house; even I ·, a dumb American, knew that thc1,t would be the place he'd head 
for. He knew other people in the town, of course, and some of .his, lieutena,nts 
~ere from that town. 
C: You said awhile ago that ... was it Walter Beetle Smith. that started OPC? 
L: No, he was at the time I went to the Phillipines·, he was• the head of · Cr A, 
and OPC was· started originally by Secretary of Defense ... died while he was in 
office, right after world War r:r.,,in the 40's ... 
C: was· it (illegible phrc1,se). 
L: No, Forrestal. 
C: Forrestal, James Forrestal. 
I.Oh b U::. A..O 
L: Yeah. And he and. / Secretary of State then ... who, · r can't thi:nkc)f i ;t 
o,., +- k e. 
now·, but between them they did ... it was some Cabinet level discuss±:on ~ ;f 
thing but it happened right after the Pottsdam Conference , and r thinR · tfie 
President had come back shocked from that meeting and when the Greek si~tuatiqn · 
was· going to pieces and other things, and they started suddenly-realizing we · 
Cl,+ e,.,11. 
had pronlems· in the world that we weren •t prepared f o r \ And this, was· one o;f · the 
early grop:j:ngs- on how to deal with it. It facinated me, .. that was a great place 
to be. 
C: Who was your boss· then in OPC? 
L: J: ' 11 tell you his: na,me when I remember ... can thi;nk. of it. He was· cf;'rom >tfie 
Department of State. It will take me a little wnile to think of ' fi:b:;: name ·, . He 
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L: ... we became very close friends and his son who was a Junior, sa;ne name, 
is- still with State, He went over to London finally and had some difficulty 
-mentally, some -mental illnesses. And then when I finally went out .. ,when they 
a.malga-mated with CIA, they formed a Far East Division and Dick Stillwell was 
the Chief of the Division and he was an Army Colonel at the t;t:me. And so when 
I'. .. finally when I got out, right before I went out to tne Phillipines' lie was 
-made Division Chief so they ... I went under their responsibility-, a,nd they 
supervised the thing for me. There was another guy went out.,,not right with 
-me .. ,Bohannan went with, me and he's dead now. His widow- is in Manila and · it 
would be someone to talk to there. But the other one, they s-ent out immediately 
after I got there, was Ace Ellis. He was the communications man with_a CIA 
oa.r oackground and was sent in to be e=. communicator. And the three of us- lived 
in a hous-e together and we got Magsaysay to live with us in there. 
C: So you were an Air Force Lt. Colonel on attached duty or deta,ched duty 
to ... 
L: Whatever it was, detached, yeah. 
C: ... to ... 
L; And I'm sure in the records it shows that I was detached to an Air Force 
Base over in Washington or something, but I'm not out in the Phillipines. And 
the same thing is true of Viet Nam. When I came back from Viet Nam they wanted 
me to stay with CIA and I didn't. I went back to the Air 'Force. 
C: You were talking about covers awhile ago. Your thin cover when you went 
to the Phillipines. I'm not sure how this works. After a time you reported to 
CI'A or reported still back through your Air Force channels'? 
L: No, CIA channels·. Yeah, I went into CIA and from there to the., .to Defense 
an the President and the rest of them. 
C: So at that point in the Air Force, the Air Force is your cover? 
L: No, no, I was an Air Force officer anyhow. Why I was in the country , 
was a cover. 
C: Oh, uh,-huh. 
L: T needed a cover and that was ... I was withMAAG originally\ I:n Viet Nam 
assistant 
when I went I asked the Air Force, I said why not make me an/ air attache, · and 
SIDE 2 ---- they said ok. I went out there and the air attache, he started talking and I' 
said, look, I'm coming in as your assistant and I won't be any- trouISJ.e at all, 
and he said, don't forget I outrank you. And I said, no, I outrank you, I am 
sorry, but I won't bother with .•. and the son of a bitch wouldn't even give me 
+i., €,/'"€-. 
a place to sit down /\ So my first days in Viet Nam were horrible, really. I' 
had an alleged position as an assistant air attache hut · no sp~ce ;tn the air 
attache's· office to sit. I went over to the USIA chief, was a real nice guy, 
a former tea planter, and I sort of liked him and we became friends just ..• 
off the spot. So he let me use part of his desk to file my papers- in. The 
CIA station chief wouldn't give me the time of day; would make me stand at 
attention in front of him, and wouldn't help me at all. My funds- were 9oing 
into ... from the Air Force .•. I was getting my Air Force pay, was- the only· -money· 
I had ... was going into my bank account in Washington with my wife with the. bank 
book. And I was scared to write checks, I didn't know-whether she spent all 
the money keeping our house going and the family going. Sor was without 
money, no place to live, I asked O'Daniel. .. 0 1 Daniel had ·me -move in until ne 
got mad at me and told me to move out, and I said you have got to :eind a place 
for me, and he did. No transportation, no nothing. And I was· worrying all 
the time that .•. people asked me, why don't you eat more, and r said I' didn~t 
have ·money for it. 
C: I don 1·t really understand that, General. If you were there in a Cii\ 
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C: capacity, why was the station chief so upset with you? Tf yeu were 
there with a cover as an air attache, why did the air attache treat you so 
badly? 
L: Well, I don't know why they did it. They just :t;igured, he is- way out 
in le:t;t :t;ield and we are going to clobber him while he is here. · And · I: couldn ~-t 
ha-ve cared less about it. I was very busy, abs0rbed in gettj:ng t0 learn about · 
the country and the problems and the problems· with the Communists cmt there, · 
and coping with all these unknowns. There was tremendous language and cultur~l 
differences and so on, so it didn't 1mean too much as long as· somewhere along 
the line :r could catch up with myself. And I used to write airmail letter,s 
to my wife and say, I'm going to write a hundred dollar check. next month and · 
that I s going to be for my food and everything, so please leave $100', 00' balance · · 
;tn the checking account. I would go along that way, and everybody thought that 
this· great big powerful organization ... and I could never let them think otner-
wi.se or they would run over me completely. And so I kept quiet about much of 
this·, and I think maybe they started inventing stories about me about that 
time ... these great powers that I had which I never had. So, anyhow, O'Daniel 
ca,lled h:j'.s BOQ, one of them, and they said, well, there's a guy on home leave 
right n0w and he can use his room. So I moved ove:ir to the BOQ, and then I was 
being invited to the top diplomatic parties and everything, and I was invited 
to one at the Vietnames·e palace that the then Prime Minister was living in, 
the one before Diem and that was the cme r went in a whi_te uniiom\1,/ dres:S· 
·uniform. /went up, a~d I. .• all the guests were coming up in staff cars mostly· 
and an honor guard was jumping to the salute and presenting the arms and 
everything as they came, up and the doors were open. And CillegibJ.e--means· 
rickshaw) were around there. There were two kinds:: there was'. the pooi' ·-man .,s, 
kind and the wealthier. manls. kind. The poor man's kind was the guy in a loin 
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L: cloth and a straw hat. And the bicycle on the front; I us·ed to nave a 
1:tttle replicc1, 0f one around here. But it was a bicycle '-3,nd · tnere . w:as, a, pla,ce• ,, 
to ride in front, there was a seat, sort of like a rickshaw- s:ea,t , So ~ c\ndthey-
were on the street, so I went and hired one of these, and said, cc1,n you d'l?.i:ve 
-me up to the palace. So I gave him some piasters and here came thi.s: long line 
of diplomats and this· guy barely able to get his bicycle up the. incline a,nd 
everyth: .. ng. And everybody presenting arms and so em and I' :r;e.b:11.:ned the 
s:alute. They paid off the guy, and the Ambassador and O;Da.niel were standing 
there; they both. told me they took a very dim view of -my· arrival. And I said ; 
well, I' need transportation, and I asked O'Daniel, I said, how about s0rne 
wheels? He said after seeing what ... yeah, T'll find you sotl)ewheels·, wfi:icfi_ 
he did, bless his heart. He found an old cv-2 Citroen, which. I loved , But 
when I got in one of the French generals came up and told me, lie, sai_d, I' ju(:t't 
paid somebody to kill you . And the guy, he claimed he g0t yeu in the dies·t 
w-;tth a r:ifle this afternoon, and I paid him off. So I unbuttoned my blouse a,na 
opened up my shirt and everything, pulled up my undershirt and said , · ".!:ind an:•r 
holes·? And this guy was looking. And so the Ambass:ador ca,me over , and you · 
were jus:t mentioning his name and, .. before, He came over and sa:i:;d , wnat "s· 
wremg? I' said, well, this: 'French general is. queer and so ;f;orth~ I 1·m jus:t 
sa, ti.s·fying, you know. This general said, I' 1m not either. He got '11la,d a, t ,me_ 
But he was· the one that ran afoul of DeGaulle later . He was- fotl)enting the 
Army revolt in North Africa against Metropolitan France in the ;f;'j:ghti:ng the;t?e i 
And he was finally exiled to ... he lived in Spain for, a ti'r!le , I' tliink fie is· 
ba,ck recently in ·France again. He had made quite a name f ci5r hi'tl)self as 
a, ver y unconventional w;3,rrior out in Indochina; not only· in 'V:i;et Nam but · a,ls'C> 
in Cambodia and La0s. r will remember his· name after c\ time. r had • an f>,,fa;, 
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"\ 
L: 'Force doctor here in the hospital not too long ago, the same name , -pro"" 
nounced differently, but the same as this· Frenchman, :r said I h~pe ycm · a 'l'.'en t t 
any relative, and he said, no, T'm not. So I said, well, the guy t'l'.'ied te 
get me killed once and now I'm trusting my life to yC!lu, and :r figured you 
-~ fr\.o+. -might be up to the wrong things. And he said, oh, no , .no.  y-. 
C: You worked then for the CIA in Viet Nam . Later on you we;r;e on the 
intelligence board. I picked up some place or other- that you wer-e a, member 
'iO 
of the (.intelligible) committee? r r ,:f- ~ 
L: Oh, now wait. No. After I left Viet Nam in ~ 56, I came back to the 
U.S. and I left any connections with CIA at that time; repe>rted in to the Air 
'Force, who assigned me to staff duty in the Air Force in the Penta_gon, the· 
beginning of '57, And from then on I had no connections· witfr the CU\. Wfien 
I: was on the Air Staff in '57, the Chief of the Air Force at the time, called 
me t0 h±.s--General White it was--called me to his office and said, the Secreta'l'.'y 
of Defense will be asking to see me pretty soon and the Air ·Force would be 
very favorable to my saying yes to them. He was going to ask me to do s0me,,.. 
thing and they thought it would be good for the Air Force to have me do it , 
c.v t. e," YI)"'-- ;-1-
so when it happens, please~consider remember we think you should d0 it. 
So the Secretary of Defense called me in a day later and he said ,, .. 
C: Which Secretary of Defense would that be? Was that still John ::Poster 
Dulles at that ... 
L: No, he was never Secretary ... he was Secretary of State, 
C: That's· right, of course. 
L: Tt was· Wilson. 
C: Charles Wils.on, 
L: Charlie. , .something like that. But he told me., we. have: a, ·man who we think 
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L: is dishonest here on our staff, and we want you to go in and replace 
him and he is an Assistant to General Erskin, who heads up our Office of 
Special Operations. And this Office of Special Operations rides, hecrd on · a,11 
defense intelligence activities, as well as other special e>perational 
Fron, 
matters. And so someone in that position has to be very honest. AndJlevery~ 
--I lie, 
nody I have check with about you, and those are many people /I one thing they 
all said was that you were honest, so I would like you to go in and take · tn-e· 
s,,, 
joh. Zlrfld-I said, well, I've been up and talked to the Air Force Chief o:e" 
Staff and the Air Force thought it would be a good thing for the Air Force 
if I did it, so I will accept. So I went in to be really an Ass·istant to 
the As·sis:tant to the Secretary of Defense. General Erskin, wh0 was· the grea tes·t 
• , . was· a Marine General, who had commanded at Iowa J'i'lna and so on · was very· well 
known in the Marines ... 4 star Marine. Was the Assistant for Special Operations>, 
s;o I went in to be his Assistant, and he had quite a sta,ff thel'.'e to de the staff 
work, scribbling papers all the time. But the defense intelligence effol'.:'t was· 
the biggest one, I guess, in the world a,t the time, ands.till is a very big one. 
And I was: interested in the name, Special Operationsj I said , well, you ' kno~ 
that will cover the type of stuff I was trying tc do on the J?hillipines · and 
Viet Nam and the u.s. is very weak in the Cold war. we have rn::>thing to match_· 
up with what the Soviets/ have and the Communis·ts· and so on, · who have a,n entirely· 
different e xperience level and training level for this· type of thj:ng, a,nd 
A;mericans aren't ready at all for that, and I' would like to develop tha,t in 
defenses. I said, no, you take care of the intelligence ends firs•t, a,nd fie · 
said, I'm not too well and I want you to bear down on it and among other things1, 
learn about the NSA which is Special Intelligence . And so r went out for 
a time with the Special I'ntelligence people, the NSA , and the Army, Navy , Air 
Force types, too. And wound up as overseeing it all. And the Army G-2, . the A;.,. 
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L: A-2, the Navy N-2, all came in to work with me. I coordinated all of 
I 
their offices· as well as the policy level of it , and NSA and what would n<Dw· be 
!!)rA, there was· no such thing at the time. I guess we 'd have been the closest 
to that except we didn't do any intelligence work. Oh, we also ha,d the J 0int 
Staffs as· an intelligence attache to ... and that was all under , .. Erskin g®t 
sick with his heart, had a heart attack and had to g0 to the hospital. And 
he went out to Bethesda Naval Hospital with his heart and left me running the 
show for him. And this guy I displaced, I never understeod this, they· di.dn ~t 
trust him, he wasn't honest so they replaced me with him . And then he stayed 
in and he was a ... level of civilian ... he was a 17 ... Grade 17, very high, and 
they jumped him to an 18 for being that and sent him in with other ••. I ha,d to 
do business ... they were doing business on things that we were in jux tapositicm · 
to. And one of them was on a committee that I was on and theyma,de him chairman 
of it. And I just suppose, it was the wrong thing to do, But they did that. 
And I had known him quite well and he used to keep telling me he was a city 
boy and I was a country boy and watch out, he was going to have this· country 
boy shown the alley in a hurry, see. It never happened, He went to jail in 
the end, but he was playing too fast and footloose on this. 
C: Who was this? 
L: Bill Goddell. I don't know whether he is in jail or not. :r: last saw· him 
going into Hong Kong on a plane from Bangkok, so ... Well, I thought he was in 
jail at the time. He said, no, they let me ... I'm proving my case out he't'e in 
Bangkok, but I don't know what ... he was a fast, .. hot air artist, fast talker. 
But anyhow, I, so I stayed with them and was Acting Assistant to the Secretary 
of Defense for Special Operations, Now, among other duties in there, was, to 
represent Defense on the U. S . Intelligence Board, and at the time the Dixiector · 
of Central Intelligence was Alan Dulles and he ran the Central I'ntelligence Board 
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L: And as- I remember, they had weekly meetings, maybe not, but it wa,s· around 
once a week they had a meeting. And I w0uld go over to that , a,l0ng with the 
Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence man, the NS'A man , would go along, and 
the State Department had an Intelligence, the nuclear and energy- people did, 
FBI, r think that was the group. And someone fr0m the White House would be · 
over. That would be the National Security Adviser. But Erskin was out f())r · 
about a couple of years and this guy that I had replaced was trying t0 get 
Erskin kicked out for good, but when he started his first moves on that, r 
caught on and I went over to the White House and talked to the Military 
Assistant to the President over there, and I said,.,and at that time it was 
Eisenhower administration ... I said, my boss, General Ersk:i:,n, is up in Bethesda 
with a heart problem and I know you went through the same thing- with Eisenhower , 
h ; f'Y\ 
and I thought it would be very nice if Ei senhower sent s · ~ a get-well note 
and encourage him a little bit. Get it over to me and I will get it ove;t: to 
Erskin by hand , so they sent me a note made up , a very nice little note from 
Eisenhower, get- well, Gravestone. His first name was Graves. Graves- B, Erskin. 
And so T took the note and I went in to a Secretary of Defens:e Staff Meeting , 
and they asked me to say something, and I said, well, it's not business , but r 
have a nice note here from the President r would like to rea,d aloud, and I'm 
going to take it out to Graves Erskin after the meeting, r told them. And 
that immediately shut off all these people who were attacking this guy, show;11j 
that the President was backing him. So that's what you learn in psy chological 
operations is to operate that way, to work on the minds of your enemies- and let 
them scare themselves into shutting up, is all that was·. But then Erskin came 
back after he got well again and when the Democrats came in aga in, when Kennedy 
came in as President , they revamped the staffing of the Secretary of Defense 
I 
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L: and they were getting ready to have a DIA, who had been working on the 
:tdea 0ff and on and they formed an Office of Special Operations under McNamara 
it-
and had -me, he asked me to be ffitrt. ... and Erskin stayed on in Special Operations· 
be fore but they were breaking it up and they took NSA supervision away from . it 
and gave it to somebody else. They were creating a DIA in kindergarten form, 
sort of, at the time, so they broke up the old office and most of the staff 
went in on that intelligence work on the thing. But I' just saved a couple of · 
5 c ,4 L -tea-fl'\ 
them on my staff who were special forces type and the Navy (illegible) types-
and so forth, which I was putting together a staff of my own and I just kept 
them in Special Operations; moved up off the D ring I off the E i'ing, which. is-
D 
the best address· in the Pentagon. I picked the jj. ring right back of . the 
Secretary of Defense's office so I could be in there in a ·minute, · faster than · 
these other guys·, and got an unfashionable address but in the :5es.-t locatfom · 
C.d,U,'fj k -1- onJ 
there is. And afterwards when they /l .. everybody wanted -my office and I: go up 
the't'e today, and I forget who's got it now, but the guy· with the s·ec!t."etary· of · 
Defense's ear is in that office, which I was trying to do originally·, hut it 
didn '. t quite work out. Bu/' anyhow, the staffing, the defense staffing of CIA, 
requests for help on covert operations that would be approved at top level for 
operations and be approved for defense help would all go through my office , and 
the staffing of the top policy cons-iderations was· done by -my office · and I did 
most of it myself, and it would usually be with the Deputy Secretary of .Defense, 
m /.LC,"1 
wi t h whom I workedA·more closely than I ever did with the Secretary of Defense. 
C: Who was· this? 
L: Well, at the end it was R.oss Kilpatrick, the last one, but befo;r:e .that the 
guy died in office; shame, a brilliant electr0nicsengineer. He died holding a_ 
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L: memo I had written him; he died in bed reading at night. It was jus:t a 
heart attack I guess, and he had a driver staying at the house , wa,s, go±ng to 
/.,Je, •I ./- ; '1, a,,,i d. 
drive him in the morning, had gone to bed and ~ · t. t he liglit was· still 
on in the morning , and he came and told me , he said, this memo was in his 
wh n he. d. ,e-d... • 
hands• Ci:'3::leg i b l e phr ase~) .. . 
C: were you involved with the Forty Committee? 
L: I don't know what the Forty Committee was or what the , .. co,vert opera,t_tg,ns, 
used to be different groups, they had different names and I' did the defense 
staffing of it, but only one member of it •.. whether it was a good operation or 
bad .. . at times I would be present and at times I wasn 1 t present. I remember 
one of them was· a discuss-ion on what later ecame the Bay· of Pigs and r OJ?posed 
it right away. And Alan Dulles was begging me to shut up, you know-; He sai d , 
K€..-e..p bt.L-le-f-, E.d-1 
you know operations, and I said, this won't work . You are doing thi s • the wrong 
+o d.o 
end, too, on the thing and he wanted Aa military operation without the wherewithall 
to do it successfully. And you guys shouldn't be the ones· to ever · do a .-military, 
operation, and ... a political revolution, yes, going up i n the hills again, yes,, 
il('ld. he... ks1eci m.e_ 1-.. .-1- +o j O ; .-i : " < ~ ~) 
but that is your bill of goods. (Illegible phrase) ... and that was during the 
end of the Eisenhower administration that fall before Kennedy was elected~ And 
that ' s· when I decided to go out and visit Viet Nam again ... you see, I 1ve been 
j' oe-5 
through these things, and when something wen-t. wrong they w~ look around :f;o !l'.1 · 
-,.i-.~y!J. 
scapegoats, and the way some of these crazy guys though:t: ~ ould point a finger 
at me somehow or other, I' was the cause of whatever happened wrong , and I' just 
wanted to be thousands of miles away and say when this happened, you ·guys were 
left in charge, and I went over to the other side of the world and know nothing · 
about i t, what you were doing, and the Assistant ... Deputy Secreta,ry, of Def ense · 
II 
that time was, I' wa$: very clo$e, he is still very :f;riendly· wi:tf1-1ne 1 · (:;od~ this 
is awful on my memory. One of the most decent men I have ever known. But he 
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L: backed me on going out and he said, it doesn't s€em to me to :fie tlieright 
reason that you want to go, and I said, look, I just feel it in -my bones that 
on+'ii!> 
something is going to go wrong ~ and you heard my first reaction for it, they 
a,re still the same. And I want to bring the Joint Staff in to take a look ' at 
the ·military feasibility of this, and, by God, we l 11 s,tick their nos~ in . a,na 
make them stand ... so right after the Bay of Pigs, they had a, heai,ing , ana :t:irs-t · 
thing the Joint Staff was ... someone else got us wrong on this•. And T said, 
+ke-,-,e,, 
you sons of bitches, I'd make you stand/land take the full load of the thing 
beforehand, and if you don't stand up, the hell with you, I wasn't ±n the · 
country when you guys were making all thes€ decisions•. They sure . tried. I • 
eventually 
think even today, they will write a book/ and say that · T was· secretly toe guy--
(Lt..~1 " -e,-) 
that tipped off Castro or ... who knows? /\ What Llw was his name, r have a 
Christmas card from him - that's horrible - but anyhow·, I wa,s finally· retired 
from the Air Force in '63 and on the last day of October, whether it~s· tne · 
30th or the 31st , whatever, however many days October ha,s·, 163 I was retired 
And a friend of mine had just been appointed, or was· being appointed, director ' 
of Food for Peace at the White House by Kennedy. He was the guy running CARE, 
whom Thad known for many years and helped him out. T think a great deal of 
CARE as a charitable organization, run very, very correctly and honestly. And 
he suggested that T come in and work with him at the White House on Food for 
Peace and come up with the ideas and so forth and keep my hand in and be avail-
wil-1../,J,,,, 
able to get classified information, and so forth by being at the White House J 
and r: said, all right, fine. So I went to work for them as an unpaid person. 
And I had to be sponsored by somebody, so I went in to the Department of 
Agricultu:r,e and they sent me over to be their unpaid man with ·Food for Peace. 
q_., 
5(;) I' was~ on the Whi'te House sta,ff for · a, ti~e as ~ ii,gri.cul tur,a,l · specialist 
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L: unpaid. 
C: When you retired as active military, at the same time, then , did you · 
retire as active intelligence? 
L: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. I retired from all other duties and went in for 
P0od for Peace and stayed there until '65, sometime in the spring, when Henry 
Cabot Lodge told me, asked me to have lunch with him, which I' did, and said 
that President Johnson, by that time, President Johnson wantedme to go out , 
go as his assistant to V'iet Nam. Lodge was going out as• Ambassador, and he 
would take care of me and he said, I will come up with a name for what you 
should be doing so •.. that makes sense to everybody, but/ want you to pacify 
the country. Well, I started talking to him; he had different idea, conc ept 
of pacification than I did and, along with most Americans, they have an idea 
the military go in and shoot up everything and everything, and while the 
strong military there this other thing comes in and does something so you 
can · t quite see, but it's got everybody peaceful and they· give up all thei:I;' 
ways· and · so forth. And I've 
<..-4 4..,S 
one of my enemies (illegible 
had military generals, including this guy that l•s· 
,.. f--y, s c~ ~ ) .,\- ~e.. + "-: ""4, 
phra se) -&.i, G-3, yelling at me once •0 ~ . I just J 
said, you guys go in and kill these people, civilians, in a village and you 
expect me to show up on the scene and go over it with a magic wand like this-, 
and they all immediately say, we love you Americans, and come up and kiss us· 
0n the cheek. It is just ... human nature isn't like that. 
C: It's· not like that. 
p<L,l<.Se. i ,1 -, .... Pe. 
L: ... is a very fine person. 
C: Why did it ... why was it important for you to keep your relationship with 
CU\ s.o quiet? Would it interfere with what you hoped to do? 
L: Well, no, it was·, it was a requirement of working with. them. They were . · 
the ones that came to me and asked me to swear never to tell · anybody , 'ivhicfi I: did. 
/ 
Side 2, Recorded December 17, 1984, page 27--Edward G. Lansdale 
L: And I can see why, the other things they were doing, Thi.s, reputa,ti'.<'!)n ' 
is- going d0wn, unfairly I think in part. They1-ve d0ne -many- brave, wonderful 
things, altruistic things· that Americans could be -very proud of. Tfrey- helped 
hecb< 
-me get that Operation BrotherA going, which the Filipinos got full credit 
for, but which largely the work of CIA with an international organizati,~n; 
which was one of the finest operations the world has ever seen towards- helping 
other nations and people in need down in the countryside where, you · know-, apa;rt 
from governments and everything, and the Communists had to imitate the thing, 
and it was a type of Cold War activity that I think even they got sort of 
proud of doing. They got the East Germans and someone else in on the thing, 
I forget who now it was, they got medical teams in and so on. And in the 
Phillipines it was helping them run an honest, decent election where the votes 
were counted and fairly and getting the Filipinos to do it. The Filipinos· st±ll 
scream a lot, but they don't want any CIA interference. Well, God damn it, if 
I were a citizen of a foreign country and got decent elections and everything 
with their help, I would ask for them, would you please come in and keep an eye 
on these rascals running things in there. 
C: What did they do to help? 
L: Well, I got them very quietly to fund certain organizations, g±ve them 
N /l~f'~t-1 
enough money to get going and come to life there ... NMFREL (,?) was one of tfiem.,. 
National Movement for Free Elections, which the Filipinos still have alive, out 
in the Phillipines· today, trying to have some semblance of democracy left there 
under dictatorship. Trying like hell to keep free elect±ons going and Marcos h~s 
emasculated it again ~ 0it hasn't any powers, but I tried to set up ways· that 
citizens could keep their freedom free and untainted, a,nd so forth. The U.S. 
can't do it otherwise, we have no means to do it, hut in this: way, is· a wa,y· of 
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L: opera t ing, and it needn't have oeen secret except that was- tfie eas-±e-s•t · 
way to do things·. And also if these people went tQ cliea,t 1 wc;;mld p :izi ,nt fa,ls;e 
.,._ ~ ; ·\ t 
ballots and everything, well, to have a fire in tlie printing plant was·,~ ,a,rid 
" 
all the ballots burn up in there, the warehouse, who else is- going t<"> do it, 
see, and how openly do you ever talk about something like that , '('et it is.- a, 
big plus on the right side of things, and well worth doing~ Well, we started 
veterans' organizations out in Viet Nam and I was trying to expand the pa,rtic.:j..'j?a,"-
tion of the citizens in their government and everything and get it 0ut - i:nto · ' 
,,, 
the country where veterans lived and so forth and I figured tney at leas•t, if 
they were going to stand up and say we want this and everything , a,nd · w<;;in · t be · · 
afra.id of asking it. And the government is· going to listen · to. : • these guY's• 
11 
fcmght, you know, and I don't want to figh against a per,son like tnat 1 · n:e '- s • 
a hero to all these people, and so that I S the way· it is- in thh,, c0un:brY', · j\nd 
I started getting the people in Saigon listening to what veterans· out • in tfie 
provinces were saying, and so on that way. It was veTy· w9rthwhile. · And c3ga±n 
I brought in a team of veterans from the Phillipines· to help , a,nd p ~id . fo:r; ' tfie·ij, 
way out of CIA funds, and they didn • t know it, they were in the CIA pay, a,na 
would be highly insulted ~ith it ... they volunteered to g0 over and nelp some- · 
fellow Asians ~gent~ and they did it through a friend 0f · tlieirs 1 'Illy-self , 
and it was up to me, I'd found some mcmey, finet they never asked .me where l 
got it. I think things like that are tremendous ways of acting covertly• in a, 
semi~open manner, , and help some of the people that we were helping · a,nd every.-.. 
thing do things were earning more money than I ever was as· a Colonel in tlie 
Air Force. And you don I t have to act like a hig shot and eve:l'.'y·thing to fielp 
p eople. As a matter of fact, it hurts rather than helps-, · ttell 1 I went nack 
to Viet Nam in '65 with Henry Cabot Lodge and it wa,si a, tiroe when · ou:i; , troop$• 
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L: were getting committed there, the first time we had forces in combat and 
were taking casual ties:, and I was getting reports from Saigon about the big 
+,.---, +o 
American establishment there, so I figure that we would have to live and ~do 
things, in sort of a Washington style but in Saigon. So I needed a staff that 
would be able to cope with that and help me cope witfr. it , anda,lso q,ne tlia,t 
would help me get close to the Vietnamese people and start influencing · tne · 
leaders and everything into doing the right thing and get the .Vietnamese 
government and people so that they felt they were one and the same and helcmged 
to each other, which is, the only way that pacification could ever work, · and · 
so, I handpicked a staff and just asked them if they would come out , and 
everyone said, yes, they would come with me. And one of them that nad been 
in '1tleetings and taken my eye, and I figured this was just the guy, he was in 
love with words and arguing and he will just take them and manipulate tnein 
1.4,t,,. le., he·~ ci .,,-115 
and absorb their attention, you know, ~ thingf and thi.s guy bece;me · · 
one of the anti-war leaders afterwards. 
C: Oh, Els ... 
tl\~\,exg 
L: ... Daniel E:l::-sISury, a brilliant young guy, a defense consultant or some.,.._ 
thing at the time, but he impressed me very much with his ability to argue a,nd 
so on, so I brought him along as much to throw at the others in committee 
meetings as anything else. And Dan was very, very naive out there. I:n a 
situation where he had to cope with the foreign element a,nd foreign culture 
and everything up close. You know, don't drink the water out of the tap a,nd 
that sort of stuff, which he did promptly and brushed his teeth,.,I' sai'd, 
Jesus·, are you brushing, I forgot you have to tea,ch. these kids tnings· like · 
that. 
C-: Don't use their i ce. 
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L: Yeah. So he was always in trouble that way, but he also had no concept 
of class,ified documents, and he used to carry secret paper s, in his pocket 
and everything . They weren't mine, but they belonged to the Bmbas:sy and a,11 
that. Jesus, I used to go crazy trying to keep him clean cm that. But his, 
heart was in the right place when he was with me, and he was always, t:i:;ying 
hard, so I excused all sorts of things for that. But I' picked up some of 
my old crew. Now this guy you are going to see tomorrow is one of them and 
Re-atrerek=P-1-> R 4,l.. • ~ 
he was, an agency boy, Joe AA-~-egi b 1-e) it was , that they sent to ·me. out ±:n 
Viet Nam because he spoke French and I needed somebody that could talk to the 
natives that I was talking to. 
O" e. o [ t-k .e., ~ ,· r,; -~ '5 a- <>•<-- p s" 
And so when he ca.me in I it was,. , . a whole bunch 
h' /-ne~ e. - me OU t there. I was all alone until suddenly I got deluged with this: 
crowd of , people coming in. They would send a ... I sent a, ·message back a,long 
with ... along with O' Daniel. We figured under the agreement there was some·~ 
thing you couldn't increase the number of foreign advisers, see , except a, 
certain number ... they told me so many Americans could come in 1 more than we 
had there then, and we were all trying to figure out how to a,dd people in , so 
I said, well, I'll take ten or whatever it was at the time and told the agency 
and they sent up to Korea, was just unwinding at the time , and got guysdown 
from the Korean theater to come through me, Ruff Phillips was one of them. 
/!..& d.cL,·, I,(_ 
But 50e -ReG€l~ek they had picked out because he spoke French in Washington and 
sent out to be with me, and all these guys came in and I ••. 
